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Abstract
In some of the more traditional parts of the world, fertility is falling
steadily, sometimes rapidly, in environments where women’s lives remain
severely constrained.  The recent experiences of Bangladesh and Egypt,
both predominantly Muslim countries, are illustrative in this regard. Since
the late 1970s, rural and urban areas in both countries have experienced
steady declines in fertility, with recent declines in rural Bangladesh similar
to those in rural Egypt, despite lower levels of development and higher
rates of poverty. This paper provides an in-depth exploration of the demo-
graphic transition in these two societies as seen through the dual lens of
society-wide gender systems and a range of relevant state policies.  It ad-
dresses three basic questions: (1) have measurable improvements in eco-
nomic opportunities for women been a factor in the fertility decline in ei-
ther country?; (2) have differences in gender systems at the societal level
provided a more favorable environment for fertility decline in Bangladesh
in comparison to Egypt, despite the former’s more modest economic
achievements?; (3) in what ways can the development strategies adopted
by the governments of Bangladesh and Egypt, with their very different
implications for women’s opportunities in contexts where personal au-
tonomy remains limited, be seen as additional factors in explaining the
similar rural fertility declines despite dissimilar economic circumstances?
After reviewing the evidence, the paper concludes that neither differences
in existing gender systems nor measurable changes in women’s opportuni-
ties have been key factors in the notable demographic successes recorded
in these two countries. Indeed, low levels of women’s autonomy have posed
no barrier to fertility decline in either country. However, there is a case to
be made that Bangladesh’s distinct approach to development, with consid-
erable emphasis on reaching the rural poor and women and a strong reli-
ance on nongovernmental institutions, may have played a part in accelerat-
ing the transition in that environment and in helping women to become
more immediate beneficiaries of that process.
This material may not be reproduced in any form without written permission from
the authors.
In some of the more persistently traditional parts of the world, fertility is
falling steadily, sometimes rapidly, in environments where women’s lives remain
severely constrained. The recent experiences of Bangladesh and Egypt, both pre-
dominantly Muslim countries, are illustrative in this regard. Both societies can
be characterized as religiously and ethnically homogeneous and socially conser-
vative. Their rural populations (55 percent of the total for Egypt, 82 percent for
Bangladesh) shared roughly the same level of fertility of about six children per woman
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, rural and urban areas in both
countries have experienced steady declines in fertility, with recent declines in rural
Bangladesh similar to those in rural Egypt despite lower levels of development
and higher rates of poverty. A fuller exploration of these two transitions reveals
important differences in development styles and subtle differences in gender sys-
tems that may have implications for the future course of the transition and for the
lives of women in these two settings, as well as in other settings where women’s
lives remain constrained.
For many years there has been a widely accepted view within the interna-
tional population field that improvements in the status or position of women rela-
tive to men are critical elements, and possibly even necessary conditions, for
significant fertility declines to occur in parts of the world that remain patriarchal
and poor. This conviction, which has been articulated in increasingly strong lan-
guage in successive international conferences on population, is most recently
echoed in the language of the Programme of Action of the International Confer-
ence on Population and Development held in Cairo in 1994:
… improving the status of women also enhances their decision-mak-
ing capacity at all levels in all spheres of life, especially in the area
of sexuality and reproduction. This, in turn, is essential for the long-
term success of population programmes. (United Nations 1994:25;
emphasis added)
4These views have been supported and reinforced by the writings of well-
known scholars. For example, Caldwell (1982), Cain (1984), and Folbre (1983,
1996) have written persuasively about the ways in which patriarchal systems
sustain high fertility. Karen Mason’s (1985) well-articulated conceptual frame-
work, which lays out the pathways through which women’s status could affect
fertility and mortality, has been highly influential in the field of demography and
has inspired an extensive literature designed to test her hypotheses empirically.
During the 1970s and 1980s, researchers repeatedly documented, using
cross-sectional data from representative surveys, consistent empirical associa-
tions between various commonly used proxies for women’s status such as educa-
tion and work status and their fertility, in a wide range of developing countries
from different regions. Comprehensive reviews of these literatures can be found
in Lloyd (1991) for work and Jejeebhoy (1995) for education. The implications
of these studies were clear: improved educational and formal employment op-
portunities for women would lead to growing proportions of women completing
primary schooling and going on to secondary schooling, and, somewhat later,
would lead to greater numbers of women participating in modern-sector employ-
ment. These collective changes would be expected to push a larger proportion of
women into the low fertility camp, with the result being a fertility transition.
More recently, much effort has gone into improved measurement of vari-
ous dimensions of women’s autonomy—a term that has gained favor over status
because of its attention to underlying capabilities rather than to characteristics or
outcomes—in order to develop a deeper understanding about the role of gender
inequality in the fertility transition. Most researchers who use the term are inter-
ested in measuring women’s access to and control over resources. Special data
collection efforts have focused primarily on three aspects of female autonomy:
(1) mobility, (2) women’s role in household decisionmaking, and (3) control over
resources. Major projects include the five-country Asian study spearheaded by
5Karen Mason and her colleagues (for example, Mason 1996) and studies by
Morgan and his colleagues in India (Dharmalingam and Morgan 1996) and Nepal
(Niraula and Morgan 1996; Morgan and Niraula 1995). Studies of female au-
tonomy in Egypt (Nawar, Lloyd, and Ibrahim 1995; Govindasamy and Malhotra
1996; Kishor 1997) and Bangladesh (Balk 1994, 1997) have found, consistent
with the empirical literature cited above, that women’s personal autonomy, how-
ever measured, is typically associated with lower fertility. Again, the implication
of these findings is that improvements in women’s autonomy would lead to fer-
tility decline.
The major insight from this newer literature relates to the importance of
gender systems as they operate at the level of the community or the society for
women’s personal autonomy. If a particular gender system severely constrains
women’s autonomy through social norms, laws, and policies, even highly edu-
cated women may have limited personal autonomy. By contrast, in environments
where women share with men equal entitlements that reflect social values and
are reinforced by law and policy, poor or uneducated women can have sufficient
personal autonomy to achieve their reproductive and other goals despite a lack of
personal resources. Studies in India (Basu 1992; Dharmalingam and Morgan 1996)
and Bangladesh (Balk 1994, 1997), as well as comparative studies in India, Ma-
laysia, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand (for example, Mason 1996), docu-
ment how these systems work and their importance in explaining individual varia-
tions in measured autonomy.
In the meanwhile, however, recent demographic trends have outpaced im-
provements in women’s status or autonomy whether measured at the individual
or community level. Many fertility declines have taken off in relatively poor
settings, with the pace of decline often proceeding most rapidly among the least
educated women (for example, Weinberger, Lloyd, and Blanc 1989). Indeed, in a
study of fertility trends in five Latin American and two African countries, the
6United Nations (1995a) found that declines in fertility within education groups
explained the overwhelming proportion of fertility change in all countries but
Peru; improvements in the education of women over time explained only 11–12
percent of the decline in Kenya and Senegal and from 33 to 60 percent of the
decline in Latin America. And in this paper, we show that recent fertility declines
in Bangladesh and Egypt have been at least as rapid among the least educated
women as among the elite. Furthermore, these are settings where one gender
system operates society-wide and where women’s autonomy remains extremely
low. While recent experience is not necessarily inconsistent with the empirical
associations established in the cross-section between women’s status or autonomy
and fertility, “History shows that the persistence of gender inequality does not
preclude the occurrence of a demographic transition” (Population Council 1996:
2; emphasis added).
In her recent presidential address to the Population Association of America,
Mason (1997a) summarized the historical and contemporary experience with fer-
tility decline: “Fertility transitions occur under a variety of institutional, cultural
and environmental conditions” (p. 449). As a follow-up to this overarching paper
on fertility transitions, Mason and Bulatao (1998) carefully detail the ways that
pre-existing gender systems can have conditioning effects on the timing and pace
of the transition. However, they appear to view these as second-order effects
rather than as primary factors in explaining the timing and pace of fertility de-
cline. They point out that the most important potential effect of gender systems
on the pace of fertility transitions relates to the costs of fertility regulation. In
settings where fertility regulation is achieved primarily through modern means,
the speed of the transition may be accelerated if women gain access to knowl-
edge, become more mobile, and have greater control over resources, all factors
that reduce the personal costs of acquiring and using modern means of fertility
regulation. Nevertheless, Mason and Bulatao (1998) point out that other factors
may intervene to ensure a fertility transition even when women’s opportunities
7are severely constrained. Family planning programs, such as the one in Bangladesh,
that deliver family planning services to the door can overcome such obstacles
(Arends-Kuenning 1997). A less recognized but equally important role of the
doorstep delivery of services may be that it brings women in contact with other
women from outside their usual social network, thus enhancing social learning
and social influence, potentially further speeding the fertility transition in the
manner described by Rosero-Bixby and Casterline (1994) as the process of inter-
action diffusion.
Research on community-based gender systems has relied primarily on the
aggregation of individual reports to create characterizations of gender systems
for the community. There has been less emphasis on collecting data at the com-
munity or state level about social institutions that may constitute “gender-spe-
cific environmental parameters” which enhance or impair women’s bargaining
power within the home (Folbre 1997). Indeed, women’s operational autonomy
may depend not only on the elements that traditionally constitute measurements
of personal autonomy such as access to and control over resources but also on
support from community institutions, such as nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), or from the state. Agarwal (1997) illustrates the potential importance of
NGOs in enhancing women’s bargaining power at the community level in envi-
ronments where women have little such power within the family. Through pro-
grams that create women-to-women connections within the context of a credit
group or as a result of the relationship between the village family planning worker
and her clients, information is shared, solidarity is created, and common interests
are addressed. As Balk (1997) notes, “programmes aimed solely at giving indi-
vidual women options would be insufficient; they would be more effective by
incorporating other household and community members” (p. 170).
Indeed, if it is at the social or state level that gender systems are most
salient in their implications for demographic change, then none of the evidence
reviewed here can be used to prove or disprove the demographic importance of
8gender or gender systems. While we know that fertility decline can occur while
women’s autonomy, as measured at the individual level, remains low, we do not
know how important social and state institutions may be in defining the opportu-
nity structures that surround women and in enhancing their collective autonomy
at a broader community level. Mason (1997b), extending her earlier work on
women’s status (1985, 1986), has pointed out the particular difficulties we face
when trying to study these relationships. One of these difficulties has to do with
the aggregated nature of demographic change. As a result, the impact of changes
in gender systems on demographic outcomes can be determined only through the
observation of successive cohorts. Mason suggests that the ideal study design
would be a longitudinal study of two populations that were initially similar in
their demographic characteristics and gender systems but subsequently experi-
enced differences in the evolution of their gender systems as a result of state action
and/or the emergence of a social or religious movement.
Following this line of thinking, we consider Bangladesh and Egypt to be
ideal candidates for such a comparison. The countries share a common religion
and similar gender systems. They have also experienced rapid rural fertility de-
clines over the same time frame in the context of similar physical surroundings—
dense settlement patterns along rivers and their deltas. Nonetheless, Bangladesh
has achieved its fertility decline under much less favorable economic circum-
stances. Furthermore, state development policies, despite similar goals, have been
articulated and implemented quite differently in Bangladesh and Egypt. Given
these differences, a comparison offers the possibility of exploring whether these
differences in state policies may have mediated the relationship between socio-
economic development and fertility decline through their effects on the opportu-
nity structures of the women who have changed their fertility behavior. Relevant
state policies would include not only development and population programs but
also responses to social changes such as rising religious fundamentalism.
9A comparison of Bangladesh and Egypt has one further advantage. These
countries, while sharing much else in common, share no common borders. Usu-
ally, they are compared with their more proximate neighbors in South Asia or in
the Middle East and North Africa, respectively, because of shared cultural heri-
tage (see Fargues 1997; Das Gupta and Narayana 1997). However, given evi-
dence of social influence across the borders of contiguous states leading to re-
gional homogeneity in demographic trends (Coale and Watkins 1986; Casterline
1998; Bongaarts and Watkins 1996), it is more difficult to see trends within South
Asia or among neighboring countries in the Middle East and North Africa as
occurring entirely independently of each other.
The paper addresses three questions: (1) Have measurable improvements
in economic opportunities for women been a factor in the fertility decline in
either country? (2) Have differences in gender systems at the societal level pro-
vided a more favorable environment for fertility decline in Bangladesh in com-
parison to Egypt, despite the former’s more modest economic achievements? (3)
In what ways can the development strategies adopted by the governments of
Bangladesh and Egypt, with their very different implications for women’s oppor-
tunities in contexts where personal autonomy remains limited, be seen as addi-
tional factors in explaining the similar rural fertility declines despite dissimilar
economic circumstances? In order to address the first question, we set the con-
temporary demographic profile of each country into the context of recent changes
in fertility and in women’s opportunities in order to see to what extent measur-
able changes in women’s lives are associated with demographic change. To ad-
dress the second question, we describe the key features of gender systems in
Bangladesh and Egypt that are broadly characteristic of each society as a whole.
From this description and review, we identify key similarities and differences in
the lives of Bangladeshi and Egyptian women that have likely conditioned the
fertility transition in each country. To address the third question, we broaden our
10
angle of vision to examine various dimensions of change at the national level to
see what implications these changes may have had for women’s opportunities
and for the pace of fertility change. In concluding the paper, we speculate about
the implications of these two settings for development strategies in other con-
texts where gender systems continue to limit women’s autonomy but where policy
goals include commitments to improve women’s lives and to reduce rates of popu-
lation growth.
RECENT TRENDS IN FERTILITY AND THEIR
DETERMINANTS
Fertility
Egypt is a highly urbanized society while Bangladesh remains largely ru-
ral. The United Nations estimates that 45 percent of Egypt’s population lives in
urban areas, and this percentage has been roughly constant for at least two de-
cades (United Nations 1995b). In 1995, 18 percent of the population in Bangladesh
was estimated to live in urban areas, doubling over the previous 20 years from a
rate of 9 percent in 1975 (United Nations 1995b). Since differences in overall
fertility can be driven by levels of urbanization alone, we compare Egypt and
Bangladesh by urban and rural characteristics separately, with a particular em-
phasis on the rural setting.
 Bongaarts and Watkins (1996) date the start of the Egyptian transition to
1968 and the start of the Bangladeshi transition to 1981, defining the onset of the
fertility transition as a decline of 10 percent from pretransitional levels. Casterline
(1998), using the same UN estimates, dates the start of the transition in Egypt to
1960–65 and the start of the transition in Bangladesh to 1970–75, commencing
from the peak from which fertility began to decline. Recent in-depth analyses of
Egypt (Fargues 1997) and Bangladesh (Dyson 1996) using crude birth rates as
11
the indicator place the start of the fertility decline earlier in both Egypt and
Bangladesh—as far back as the early 1960s. It is likely that this earlier decline in
birth rates is related to delayed marriages rather than to birth control within mar-
riage (Coale 1988; Huq and Cleland 1990). Although none of these analyses of
trends is broken down by rural and urban area, it is likely that much of the early
decline in Egypt was confined to urban areas. Rural fertility in Egypt was esti-
mated at 6.1 in 1980, roughly the same level as rural fertility in Bangladesh in
1975. While rural fertility levels were possibly higher in Egypt than in Bangladesh
at that time, nonetheless it appears that rural fertility was relatively high in both
settings into the early 1980s. This, then, becomes a useful starting point for the
assessment of trends (see Figure 1).
Table 1 shows the latest data on the demographic situation in Bangladesh
and Egypt. In both rural and urban areas, current fertility estimates for Egypt
exceed comparable estimates for Bangladesh. The rural fertility rate of 4.2 chil-
dren per woman for Egypt compares with 3.4 in Bangladesh. The urban fertility rate
of 3.0 in Egypt compares with an urban rate of 2.1 in Bangladesh. Ideal family size is
lower in Bangladesh than in Egypt, suggesting that lower fertility is partially ex-
plained by a stronger motivation to control fertility. Contraceptive use rates are also
consistently higher in Bangladesh than in Egypt in both rural (7 percentage points)
and urban areas (6 percentage points). Rates of unmet need for contraception are
similar in both countries and consistent with contraceptive use rates.
Differences in contraceptive use rates between the two countries, however,
cannot explain the entire difference in fertility, particularly given the much lower
mean age at marriage in Bangladesh.1 In fact, couples in Bangladesh would need
considerably higher levels of contraceptive use than implied by cross-national
estimates to compensate for the higher duration of exposure to the risk of child-
bearing brought about by women’s much earlier age at marriage. The median
ages at marriage in Bangladesh for women aged 25–49 in 1996 were 13.8 and
••
• •
•
•
•
•
19
75
19
80
19
84
19
88
–8
9
19
93
19
95
19
96
–9
7
2
3
4
5
6
7
To
ta
l F
er
til
ity
 R
at
e
Bangladesh
Egypt
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
19
75
19
80
19
84
19
88
–8
9
19
93
19
95
19
96
–9
7
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Co
nt
ra
ce
pt
iv
e 
U
se
 (%
)
Bangladesh
Egypt
•
•
•
•
•
•
• •
19
75
19
80
19
84
19
88
–8
9
19
93
19
95
19
96
–9
7
2
3
4
5
6
7
To
ta
l F
er
til
ity
 R
at
e Bangladesh
Egypt
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
• •
19
75
19
80
19
84
19
88
–8
9
19
93
19
95
19
96
–9
7
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Co
nt
ra
ce
pt
iv
e 
U
se
 (%
)
Bangladesh
Egypt
Rural Urban
Figure 1  Trends in Fertility and Contraceptive Use in Rural and Urban Areas of
Bangladesh and Egypt
SOURCES: TFR: Contraceptive Use:
1975, 1980: Ashurst, Balkaran, Egypt: El-Zanaty et al. 1996
and Casterline 1984 Bangladesh: Tabulated from Surveys
1988–1995, Egypt: El-Zanaty et al. 1996
1989, Bangladesh: Huq and Cleland 1990
1993: Mitra et al. 1994
Rural Urban
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15.3 in rural and urban areas respectively, compared to 17.9 and 21 in rural and
urban Egypt.2 Even the longer breastfeeding durations in Bangladesh are not suf-
ficient to explain women’s surprisingly low levels of fertility in relationship to
Egypt. Instead, higher rates of abortion in Bangladesh relative to Egypt are the
most likely explanation. Bangladesh is unusual in having widely available ser-
vices for early termination of pregnancy by menstrual regulation. More impor-
Table 1  Demographic Characteristics: Bangladesh 1996–97 and Egypt 1995
Rural Urban
Bangladesh Egypt Bangladesh Egypt
Total fertility rate 3.4 4.2 2.1 3.0
Contraceptive use (percent of
currently married women 15–49) 48 41 62 56
Median age at first marriage
(ever-married women 25–49) 13.8 17.9 15.3 21.0
Median length of amenorrhea
(months) 8.8 7.7 5.6 3.3
Median duration of breastfeeding
(months) 32.8 19.5 32.8 17.9
Infant mortality rate (age <1) 91 87 73 51
Child mortality rate (ages 0–5) 131 116 96 65
Unmet need for spacing or limiting
(percent of currently married
women 15–49) 17 20 10 11
Ideal desired family size 2.5 3.0 2.3 2.6
Muslim population (percent)a 89 96 90 93
Percent of children 7–12 in schoola 78 79 77 93
Percent of children 12–15 with
4+ years of schoolinga 52 74 64 90
a Tabulated directly from Bangladesh DHS (1996–97) and Egypt DHS (1995).
SOURCES: El-Zanaty et al. 1996; Mitra et al. 1997
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tantly, unlike Egypt, where abortion services are not widely available and can be
obtained from doctors only under limited circumstances, menstrual regulation in
Bangladesh is highly accessible because the procedure is conducted by female
paramedics and is available in rural health centers free of charge (Amin 1996).
Socioeconomic Conditions
At the societal level, various factors have been linked with the onset and
pace of fertility decline in recent as well as earlier assessments of fertility transi-
tions.3 While the emphases may vary from author to author, three factors that
feature prominently in all theoretical and empirical analyses of the fertility tran-
sition are economic development, mortality, and social effects variously named
social interaction, diffusion, or ideational change. We briefly review evidence for
each of these factors in turn.
 A comparison of economic development in Bangladesh and Egypt would
lead us to expect that Egypt would be further along in the demographic transition
than Bangladesh. With a 1994 real per capita income of US$3,846, Egypt is con-
siderably wealthier than Bangladesh with a per capita income of US$962 in the
same year (UNDP 1997). The ratio of relative per capita incomes was about the
same 25 years ago at considerably lower levels of per capita income (United
Nations 1985). Recent assessments by UNDP (1996) also put Egypt substan-
tially higher in the ranking on the gender development index, which assesses
gender differences in all the constituent elements of the human development in-
dex (income, education, and mortality). Furthermore, the percentage of popula-
tion below the poverty line according to a newly constructed “human” poverty
index, which encompasses factors other than income,4 is estimated at 34.8 per-
cent for Egypt and 48.3 percent for Bangladesh (UNDP 1997), supporting the
assumption that the income differentials translate to higher levels of poverty in
Bangladesh. However, the gap is not as wide as might be expected based on more
15
conventional measures of poverty and based on income alone.5 Finally, relative
levels of per capita income and poverty suggest that there is much greater in-
equality in Egypt than in Bangladesh.
Overall levels of adult educational attainment are higher in Egypt than in
Bangladesh, although rates of enrollment for children of primary school age are
similar (see Table 1). High enrollment in Bangladesh may be attributable to sev-
eral recent education policies, including enrollment drives, incentive schemes,
and non-formal education programs. The relatively low proportion of adoles-
cents (aged 12–15) who have at least four years of schooling shows, however,
that, at least in rural Bangladesh, current levels of enrollment are a recent phe-
nomenon. The percentage of 12–15-year-olds with at least four years of educa-
tion is 52 percent in rural Bangladesh compared to 74 percent in rural Egypt.
Several other factors have potential importance because of their implica-
tions for overall levels of development as well as for diffusion or social interac-
tion effects. These include urbanization and population density. A substantial ur-
ban economy in Egypt provides opportunities to the surrounding rural areas
through labor migration. Thus, the level of urbanization is likely to exert an inde-
pendent influence on fertility in rural areas by creating higher levels of aspira-
tions through the urban influence. On the basis of the level of urbanization for the
country as a whole, fertility levels should be lower in Egypt relative to the con-
siderably more rural Bangladesh. On the other hand, the two countries have simi-
larly high levels of population density. Bangladesh averages 825 persons per
square kilometer and Egypt averages 988.6
Finally, mortality rates in Egypt are substantially lower than in Bangladesh
in both rural and urban areas (except in the case of the infant mortality rates in
rural areas, where the gap has almost closed between the two countries), but the
difference is generally greater for urban areas. For all of these underlying reasons, we
would expect Egypt to be further along in the fertility transition than Bangladesh.
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Women’s Opportunities
A comparison between the two countries of some common measures of
women’s status as well as a few indicators of women’s autonomy suggests that
women in both settings still fare extremely poorly, particularly in rural areas, by
international standards (see Table 2). Indeed, by breaking down our comparisons
into rural and urban, we see how surprisingly similar the situation of Egyptian
and Bangladeshi women appears in many respects. First, looking at household
structure, we find similar levels of reported female headship: 9 percent in both
rural and urban Bangladesh and 12 percent in Egypt. Women’s relationships within
the household are also similar: 73 percent of currently married rural women (aged
15–49) were wives of the household head in both Bangladesh and Egypt, and 78
and 85 percent were wives of the household head in urban Bangladesh and Egypt
respectively.
Among rural women, 57 percent in Bangladesh and 59 percent in Egypt
have no schooling, and only 31 and 30 percent have at least four years of school-
ing. While the percent of women working for cash is higher in rural Bangladesh
than rural Egypt, only a small minority of women in either setting is engaged in
remunerative activities. Indeed, only 23 percent of rural women in Bangladesh
reported working for cash compared to less than half that fraction (11 percent) in
Egypt. In urban areas, women fare somewhat better. Thirty-six and 27 percent of
urban women in Bangladesh and Egypt respectively have no education, while 55
and 66 percent have at least four years. A noticeable improvement in access to
education is evident by contrasting women to girls. Between 68 and 94 percent of
girls aged 7–12 are enrolled in school in rural and urban areas in the two countries.
Only 9–12 percent of currently married rural women report being prima-
rily responsible for decisionmaking related to the family budget, which is more
consistent with rates of cash work in Egypt than in Bangladesh. In urban areas of
both countries, between 21 and 25 percent of women work for cash and 16 per-
17
Table 2  Current Indicators of Women’s Status and Autonomy (in Percent):
Bangladesh 1996–97 and Egypt 1995
Rural Urban
Bangladesh Egypt Bangladesh Egypt
Household Structure
Female-headed households 9 12 9 12
Currently married women
(15–49), wife of head 73 73 78 85
Education
Ever-married women (15–49)
with no education 57 59 36 27
Ever-married women (15–49) with
at least 4 years of education 31 30 55 66
Girls (7–12) enrolled in school 79 68 77 94
Ever-married women (15–49)
with husband having 5 or more
years of education 17 28 21 25
Work
Ever-married women (15–49)
working for cash at time of survey 23 11 25 21
Autonomy
Currently married women (15–49)
taking primary role in decision-
making about family budget 12a 9b 16a 16b
Currently married women (15–49)
reporting ability to go out
shopping alone 7a 63c 27 a 78c
NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, tabulated from standard recode tapes of Bangladesh DHS
(1996–97) and Egypt DHS (1995).
a Huq and Cleland 1990
b El-Zanaty et al. 1993
c Sayed et al. 1989
18
cent take a primary role in decisionmaking about the family budget. The rela-
tively high proportion of women working for cash in Bangladesh appears to be a
recent phenomenon, and is discussed further below. The only striking difference
between Bangladeshi and Egyptian women from these data can be seen in their
reported degrees of mobility. Even in urban Bangladesh, only 27 percent of women
report being able to go out shopping alone, whereas 78 percent of urban Egyptian
women are able to do so. Mobility is relatively more restricted in rural areas in
both countries, but the differences between women in the two countries remain sub-
stantial. The lower mobility of Bangladeshi women may help sustain the long
breastfeeding durations that have been traditional in Bangladesh.
There are many economic, social, and political factors to consider in un-
derstanding what lies behind the ongoing demographic transitions in Bangladesh
and Egypt. An in-depth analysis of the Bangladesh experience ruled out eco-
nomic and social explanations in favor of a strong family planning program
(Cleland et al. 1994). Recent analyses of the Egyptian experience reach strongly
conflicting conclusions on the role of the family planning program relative to
other socioeconomic changes in the recent fertility decline (Fargues 1997; Robinson
and El-Zanaty forthcoming).
The contribution of women’s schooling to fertility decline may be illustra-
tive as a marker for the contribution of changing underlying characteristics. While
there is some evidence that the levels of women’s education have improved for
younger cohorts and that, particularly in Bangladesh, the gender gap is narrow-
ing for the youngest cohorts of women (see Figure 2), it is by no means clear that
gains in educational attainment explain changing fertility. On the contrary, as
shown in Table 3, the rise in contraceptive use has been at least as rapid among
uneducated women as among women with higher education in both Bangladesh
and Egypt. As a result educational differentials in contraceptive use and fertility
have diminished rapidly.
Figure 2  Percent of Males and Females with 4 or More Years of Education by
Five-Year Age Groups: Rural and Urban Areas of Bangladesh 1996–97 and
Egypt 1995
Note:  Cohorts attending primary school in years specified
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Taken together, this review would rule out improvements in the economic
opportunities of reproductive-aged women, either as conventionally defined us-
ing measures of education and work or as recently defined using more subjective
measures of women’s autonomy, as a driving force behind the fertility decline or
Table 3  Contraceptive Prevalence Rates (CPR) and Total Fertility Rates (TFR)
by Women’s Educational Level: Bangladesh 1975–96 and Egypt 1980–95
Bangladesh
1975 1989 1993–94 1996
TFR TFR TFR
Educational level  CPR TFRa CPR 1984–88 CPR 1991–94 CPR 1993–96
None 7 6.1 28 4.5 41 3.8 46 3.9
Incomplete primary — 6.4 33b 4.4 b 46 3.4 51 3.3
Primary completed 14 6.7 39 b 4.0 b 46 3.3 51 3.0
Secondary 27 5.0 49 3.3 56 2.6 56 2.1
Egypt
1980 1988 1992 1995
Educational level CPRa TMFRa,c CPR TFR CPR TFR CPR TFR
None 17 6.5 28 5.7 38 5.0 41 4.6
Lower primary 25 6.4 43 5.1 54 4.0 51 3.7
Primary through
secondary 32–35 6.2 52 3.8 56 3.0 51 3.1
Completed secondary
or higher 66–69 3.8 53 3.2 58 2.9 57 3.0
a
 United Nations 1987.
b
 The 1989 Bangladesh Fertility Survey used lower primary (1–4) and upper primary (5–6).
c
 WFS 1980 (Egypt) does not allow for the calculation of TFR. The total marital fertility rate
(TMFR) is given instead.
SOURCES: El-Zanaty et al. 1993, 1996; Mitra et al. 1994, 1997; Sayed et al. 1989.
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even as a catalytic factor speeding decline in Bangladesh and Egypt. Despite
noticeable improvements in access to education for the current generation of chil-
dren in both countries, levels of illiteracy in rural areas remain high among the
very women who have participated in the countries’ recent rapid fertility de-
clines. Even in the mid-1990s, less than a third of reproductive-aged women in
either rural Egypt or rural Bangladesh have completed four years of schooling,
the level beyond which fertility rates typically decline in cross-sectional compari-
sons (Jejeebhoy 1995). At the same, time only a small minority of women in either
setting is engaged in any form of directly remunerative work despite much lower
fertility rates in the 1990s.
GENDER SYSTEMS
Gender systems are inextricably entwined with family systems and must
be understood in that context. The traditional division of familial responsibility
between men and women is based on the complementarity of gender roles. There
is considerable evidence of a gender-based household division of labor in both
Bangladesh and Egypt (Naguib and Lloyd 1994; Govindasamy and Malhotra
1996; Amin 1997). Time-use data from rural Bangladesh suggest that men and
women have completely separate spheres of responsibility: women spend most
of their time in household chores and childcare, while men spend their time in
agricultural or other income-earning activities (Amin 1997). While we do not
have comparable time-use data for Egypt, attitudinal data suggest that women
and men have separate spheres of influence in which they exercise significant
power and authority. As might be expected, women’s domains include household
management, childcare, and reproduction (Govindasamy and Malhotra 1996). Fur-
thermore, the corporate nature of the family in most Asian societies means that women’s
interests are strongly tied to the interests of the family (Cain 1984). Along a similar
vein, it has been argued that, in the familial context in Egypt, both men and women
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value social interdependence more highly than autonomy (Nawar, Lloyd, and Ibrahim
1995). As a result, the gender-based division of roles makes for a highly interdepen-
dent structure within the family.
 With common religious traditions but different cultures, the gender sys-
tems in these two societies have striking similarities and notable differences.
Much has been written about the low status of women in both Egypt and
Bangladesh (for example, Cain, Khanam, and Nahar 1979 for Bangladesh and
Naguib and Lloyd 1994; Nawar, Lloyd, and Ibrahim 1995 for Egypt). In our
discussion below, we explore the various ways the Egyptian and Bangladeshi
gender systems manifest themselves through marriage, remunerative work, and
the practice of seclusion.
Marriage
Several aspects of the Egyptian and Bangladeshi gender systems, particu-
larly those derived from Islamic personal laws about marriage and the family,
appear to be similar. Islamic laws grant unequal rights of divorce and inheritance
to men and women. Men have the right to verbal divorce and polygamy. Women
can seek divorce only if it is explicitly granted to her in the marriage contract.
Women are not allowed to practice polygamy under any circumstances, although
both men and women are allowed to remarry if divorced, deserted, or widowed.
Marriage between kin is permitted in Islam. Women inherit half as much as their
brothers from their parents. Wives inherit an eighth of a husband’s property while
a husband inherits all of his wife’s property upon her death (Naguib and Lloyd
1994, Cain, Khanam, and Nahar 1979).
Although not codified in law, there are also broad similarities between
Bangladesh and Egypt in customary practice with regard to marriage and family.
As in most societies, residence is patrilocal and young couples start married life
in or near the husband’s parents’ household. Egyptian society appears to show
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strong preference for within-kin marriages and endogamous marriages in general
(Fernea 1985). While Bangladeshis do not appear to have the same strength of
preference for kin relations in choice of marriage partners, most marriages show
strong preference for within-village marriages with similar justification and im-
plications as kin marriages. In an arranged marriage, a bride is more likely to be
secure and happy when she is married within the family or the village because
her neighbors are more likely to be familiar to her. There is some evidence in
both Egypt and Bangladesh that brothers have de facto control over their sisters’
inheritance. Women appear to give up their claim to parental property in exchange
for visitation rights after marriage, or as a way of maintaining the right to return in
case of divorce (Naguib and Lloyd 1994; Cain, Khanam, and Nahar 1979).
The incidence of polygyny is low in both Egypt and Bangladesh, despite
its legality. Proportions of women currently divorced or ever-remarried are also
similar in both settings. Proportions currently divorced were 1.9 percent in
Bangladesh in 1993 and 1.4 percent in Egypt in 1992, and proportions married
more than once were 7.3 and 5.4 percent respectively (Kishor and Neitzel 1996).
The actual incidence of divorce is clearly higher than the rates recorded here. It is
masked by tendencies to remarry soon after for those who are divorced, espe-
cially at young ages. In both settings, most of the relatively few divorces take
place in the first few years of marriage (Barakat 1985; Mostafa et al. 1996).
One indication of gender inequality within marriage in both societies is the
slight rise in the educational advantage of husbands relative to wives in a context
in which the overall levels of schooling among marriageable young men and
women are rising rapidly. The percentage of couples in which the husband has
five or more years of schooling than the wife has risen from 15 percent in 1975 to
22 percent in 1996–97 in urban Bangladesh and from 17 percent in 1980 to 25
percent in 1995 in urban Egypt (see Table 4). In rural areas the increase has been
particularly marked in Egypt, where it has risen to 28 percent. Obviously in the
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past, when few men or women attended school, the possibility for such differen-
tials was limited.
Despite all the above similarities, a fundamental and consequential differ-
ence in marriage practices is the considerably earlier ages at marriage for women
in Bangladesh and the resulting greater age difference between spouses. There is
no ready explanation for this pattern except to note that both Bangladesh and
Egypt adhere to broad regional patterns. Table 4 shows levels and trends in the
percent of women aged 25–49 married before the age of 18 in urban and rural
areas. While marriage age has been rising in both countries and in urban and rural
settings, the proportion of women marrying before 18 in urban Bangladesh re-
mains a surprising 75 percent, in contrast to 30 percent in urban Egypt. Similar
differences between the two countries persist in rural areas, where 90 percent of
women in Bangladesh are married before 18 as compared with 53 percent in
Egypt.
It is likely that these differences in the average age at marriage are associ-
ated with customs and practices related to sexual control of young women. Re-
cent data from Egypt have documented a very high prevalence of female circum-
cision (97 percent of all ever-married women), most of it involving partial or
total excision of the clitoris (El-Zanaty et al. 1996). These practices are non-
existent in Bangladesh. Defloration ceremonies to validate a bride’s virginity are
common in Egypt, but almost unheard of in Bangladesh. In general, probably
because of a tradition of early marriage, practices and rituals to ascertain virgin-
ity at marriage or to ensure virginity at the time of marriage are not as developed
in Bangladesh as they are in Egypt or other settings where marriage occurs at a
later age for women.
A concomitant of early marriage for women is the age difference between
spouses. The World Fertility Survey showed that the median age difference be-
tween spouses was 6.2 years in Egypt and 9.1 years in Bangladesh (Casterline,
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Williams, and McDonald 1986). Consequently, in 1996–97, 88 percent of women
in rural Bangladesh were married to husbands more than five years older, com-
pared to 69 percent in rural Egypt in 1995 (see Table 4). The corresponding fig-
ures for urban areas are nearly identical—87 percent in Bangladesh and 67 per-
cent in Egypt. There is some indication from more localized studies that small
changes in age differences at marriage have taken place. Amin and Cain (1997)
present data from two Bangladeshi villages in the 1990s which suggest that, although
age at marriage has risen slightly for women, the consequent change in spousal age
differences has been minimal.
Cain’s (1984) explanation for differences in gender systems across societ-
ies links differences in spousal age to women’s vulnerability in marriage and
hence to the strength of patriarchy. According to this measure, Bangladeshi soci-
ety is among the most strongly patriarchal in the world. In order for men to re-
main married for as long as they do and not spend time in the divorced or wid-
owed state, everything else being equal, large age differences require a greater
number of years spent in either the divorced or widowed state for the younger
partner. Goldman and Pebley (1989) showed that, in Bangladesh, this is achieved
by higher rates of remarriage for men. In Egypt the mean age difference is con-
siderably lower.
In Bangladesh, dowry demands at marriage have become commonplace,
although it was not the custom even a generation ago. The rise of dowry in
Bangladesh is similar to trends in other South Asian communities where it was
not part of the traditional marriage transaction. While a full exploration of the
rise of dowry is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that the advent of such
a practice has strong negative implications for women (Amin and Cain 1997). It
reinforces preference for sons and has immediate implications for the young daugh-
ters of a household who cannot be married off until the accumulation of dowry.
In Egypt, there are reports of rapid inflation of costs related to marriage that may
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take the form of gifts given or festivities held around the event of marriage (Barakat
1985). While these may be equally burdensome for the families of the bride and
the groom in financial terms, the rationale for gifts or marriage festivities in Egypt
is to secure a good marriage, standing in sharp contrast to the practice of dowry
in Bangladesh, which is more crudely about paying a man to take a daughter off
a father’s hand. The symbolic import of these cultural practices on the prestige of
women is considerable. It is also clear that the inflation of marriage costs im-
poses significant financial burdens on families in both contexts.
Remunerative Work
As with marriage law and practice, there are both similarities and differ-
ences between Bangladesh and Egypt in the ability of married women to earn
cash for their work. The similarity between the two countries lies in the levels of
women engaged in remunerative work, which are relatively low by international
standards; the differences lie in the type and location of work among the small
minority of women who are able to earn cash and in the recent sharp increases in
Bangladesh.
The literature contains hugely varying estimates of the level of women’s
labor force participation in developing countries; this is because of the difficulty
of measuring much of the work that takes place outside the modern sector when
employment is not formalized, salaries are not paid, and work is irregular and/or
seasonal. It is widely recognized that much of the economically valuable work
performed by women is never counted (United Nations 1995c), but attempts to
rectify the undercount often lead to further confusion as estimated levels of
women’s labor force participation fluctuate widely from survey to survey.7
In order to create some consistency between estimates, we have gone back
to the original wording from each of the WFS and DHS surveys on work from
Egypt and Bangladesh, and counted only those women who reported currently
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working for pay or cash at the time of the survey.8 We focus on work for cash
because we feel that only when women are able to earn cash on their own ac-
count—rather than indirectly earning cash for the family by contributing to earn-
ings from a family farm or business or providing savings to the family even more
indirectly by growing food for home consumption—are they able to gain some
control over spending and some decisionmaking power within the home.
Our estimates of work rates suggest that labor force participation is rela-
tively low and that little change occurred during the initial years of fertility de-
cline. This assessment is also supported in the case of Egypt by data on female
participation in economic activity from the 1976 and 1986 censuses (Fergany
1994 as cited in Fargues 1997). However, there has been a rather sudden increase
in the proportions of women reporting work for cash between the 1993 and the
1996–97 surveys in Bangladesh. The changes in Egypt are very small, and prob-
ably trivial (Table 4). The latest surveys show the percent of women working for
cash in urban Bangladesh to be slightly higher than in urban Egypt (25 percent
versus 21 percent), representing a reversal since Egyptian rates were higher than
those for Bangladesh in the previous two surveys. The rural comparisons are
somewhat different: Bangladesh always had slightly higher rates compared to
Egypt and now the difference is substantial (23 versus 11 percent).9 As we dis-
cuss later, there is some evidence that the rise of cash work may be related to the
experience of NGO activities in rural Bangladesh. The important finding from
our point of view is the overall low rates of work for cash by married women
prior to, or during the early years of fertility decline in either society.
Differences between Egypt and Bangladesh in gender systems as they re-
late to women’s work manifest themselves largely in work location, a factor that
is closely linked to type of activity. Table 5 indicates that, for those married women
who work for cash, the majority of women in rural Bangladesh work at home (80
percent) and, even in urban areas, 47 percent work at home. More striking is the
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rise in the percent of women’s cash work taking place at home. The percentages
of all women working for cash at home among those working for cash in 1975
were 35 and 19 in rural and urban areas respectively. This may partially reflect
the growth of micro-enterprise and credit schemes for women, which increas-
ingly give them the flexibility of working at home. By contrast, only 8 percent of
working women work at home in rural Egypt and only 10 percent in urban Egypt.
The occupational distribution for working women is also very different in the
two countries. While few working women in Bangladesh work in the modern
professional or clerical occupations associated with salaried work, a rising per-
cent of Egypt’s working women do so. The proportion of women in salaried jobs
has risen from 25 to 55 percent between 1980 and 1995. In contrast, only 4 per-
cent of Bangladeshi women hold professional or clerical jobs. Given that most
other forms of work for Bangladeshi women largely take place at home, we pre-
sume that this work is more traditional than it might be in another setting. In
contrast to Egypt, where almost a quarter of the paid female labor force works
outside the home in agriculture, agriculture is not an important source of cash
work for women in Bangladesh.
Seclusion
The practice of seclusion or purdah, usually associated with Islamic soci-
eties, has been implicated in women’s low levels of labor force participation in
Bangladesh. In addition, there is some evidence from West Bengal, where labor
force participation among Hindu Bengali women is also considerably limited,
that the local culture interacts with Islamic injunctions of female seclusion to
reinforce the limits on women’s work. The study of purdah and its evolution in
Bangladesh has a long history, and there is now a reasonable consensus that the
practice and meaning of purdah continue to evolve with changing social circum-
stances. For instance, Simmons, Mita, and Koenig (1992) demonstrate how, among
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female family planning workers whose primary responsibility is to go door-to-
door to offer services and encourage birth planning, women reinterpreted purdah
to mean modesty in thought, rather than modesty in dress as it is commonly
understood. Similarly, Siddiqi (1991) argues that garment-factory workers who
have to work alongside men have chosen to focus on the indoor–outdoor space
definition related to women’s seclusion, and the factory floor is depicted as se-
cluded space like the home, where there is strict supervision and therefore con-
trol to prevent illicit contact between the men and women who work there. The
experience of the first generation of working women, where work is considered a
major violation of the norms of seclusion, suggests that while women reinterpret
the meaning of specific purdah practices to suit the circumstances of their own
work, few challenge the basic tenets of the custom of seclusion, or its objective,
which is to control the women’s sexuality.
In Egypt, it is evident from the mobility data shown in Table 2 that the
practice of seclusion operates differently. While overall levels of participation in
the labor force remain low, women are freer to move outside the home. In par-
ticular, it is acceptable for women to trade in the market and to congregate for
prayers in mosques—freedoms that Bangladeshi women traditionally do not en-
joy. Perhaps because of this greater degree of participation by women in some
public institutions, Egyptian women report greater mobility than women in
Bangladesh.
The practice of veiling has strong symbolic import in both contexts. In
Bangladesh, as in most of the Indian subcontinent, women have remained tradi-
tional in dress and have never embraced Western clothing even though it is com-
mon for men. In contrast, Egyptian women commonly wear European clothes
and have done so for some time in urban areas. However, rising anti-Western
sentiments and religious revivals have brought back the veil in several quarters.
It is probably also relevant that historically in Bengal, the central cultural issue of
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women’s seclusion was about spatial confinement in the home—thus, the word
zenana (indoor space, women’s world) appears frequently to refer to the practice
of seclusion rather than to other concepts related to purdah.
In Bangladesh, specifics about women’s dress codes have never been as
contentious as they appear to be in Egypt. Part of the explanation may be that
dress codes have remained traditional in other ways and never changed as dra-
matically as they did in Egypt. But the more important underlying explanation
must be that women do not appear in as many public places as women in Egypt—
veiling only emerges as an issue to regulate or circumscribe the presence of sig-
nificant numbers of women in the public arena.
THE ROLE OF THE STATE
In myriad direct and indirect ways, the actions and reactions of the state
have a bearing on the social and economic context within which individuals and
couples develop and implement their reproductive decisions. State policy—in
both its active and passive forms—also plays a role in the evolution of gender
systems, through its direct implications for the evolution of economic opportuni-
ties for women as well as indirectly as a consequence of policies or state actions
designed for other ends (McNicoll 1998). In this section we review some of the
key ways over the past 20 years that the governments of Bangladesh and Egypt
have shaped women’s lives and the opportunities they face, with potential impli-
cations for the pace of fertility decline, not only directly through their population
policies but also indirectly through their very different development styles and
social policies.
Although both Bangladesh and Egypt took their cues on policy formula-
tion from international trends in development fueled substantially by aid flows,
their rural development policies have differed considerably. Bangladesh has taken
a more proactive role in targeting women and the rural poor than Egypt, probably
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as a response to its widely held image as the international “basket-case” at the
time of its independence in 1971.
At about the same time as Bangladeshi independence, Egypt experienced
an economic and political turning point in 1973 because of Anwar Sadat’s infitah,
or open door economic policies, but the spirit of the policies could not have been
more different from those being formulated in Bangladesh. Rising out of the
peace agreement with Israel, the open door policies were related to a more tradi-
tional development approach. Egypt has fared far better than Bangladesh in terms
of growth in per capita income, consumption, improved life expectancy, and other
aggregate quality-of-life indicators. As discussed above, however, these improve-
ments in levels of living have been accompanied by high and rising inequality
within the society.
We begin with a short review of population policy in the two countries,
with a focus on differences in family planning service delivery, and then treat in
greater depth three aspects of the role of the state that are particularly salient to
the issues at hand: the role of NGOs as partners in rural development, the state’s
investment in education for girls, and the state’s reaction to rising religious fun-
damentalism.
Population Policy and Family Planning Services
Bangladesh and Egypt have similar early histories of population policy. In
both settings, concerns about rapid population growth and high population den-
sity were evident more than 50 years ago. The first discussions about population
growth and the need for control were sounded in Egypt as early as 1937 (Ibrahim
and Ibrahim 1998). In the area of present-day Bangladesh, as well as in India,
similar concerns about population pressure were voiced in the 1930s and 1940s
(Srinivasan 1995). Early policy initiatives in the two countries appear to have
been similar in the 1960s, with considerable emphasis on promoting small-fam-
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ily norms but little investment in infrastructures for service provision. Several
recent studies provide comprehensive reviews of population policy (Robinson
and El-Zanaty forthcoming on Egypt; Cleland et al. 1994 on Bangladesh). In this
section, we provide a discussion of the main points.
In Bangladesh, a major turning point in the population sector came in the
mid-1970s with strong high-level pronouncements about commitment to popula-
tion and, more importantly, a decision to employ a large cadre of family planning
workers to offer doorstep delivery of services. Female paramedics visited women
in their homes and offered contraceptive methods and limited health services.
The doorstep-delivery model was widely recognized as a highly successful means
of service provision in rural Bangladesh, and the reliance on female paramedics
increased. Starting in the late 1970s, menstrual regulation services were pro-
vided by a slightly more highly qualified cadre of paramedical personnel. In 1995
more than 5,000 Family Welfare Volunteers, trained to provide menstrual regula-
tion services, insert IUDs, and administer injectable contraception, were posted
in rural health centers throughout the country. These paramedics are also trained
to provide basic antenatal services and to immunize women and children against
major childhood diseases.
In Egypt, while there has been a steady rise in government attention to
population issues over the years, only in 1984 did the government adopt clear
policy objectives for the population sector, and in 1993 the former National Popu-
lation Council was elevated to Ministry status (Ibrahim and Ibrahim 1998). While
the government’s population policy involves much more than family planning,
its main thrust has been the distribution of contraceptives in family planning
clinics. There has always been a heavy reliance on trained medical personnel for
the provision of family planning services in Egypt.
A comparison of the distribution of contraceptive use by method between
Bangladesh and Egypt reflects this medicalization (see Figures 3A and 3B). Egypt
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Figure 3A  Trends in Contraceptive Method Mix: Rural Bangladesh 1975–97
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Figure 3B  Trends in Contraceptive Method Mix: Urban Bangladesh 1975–97
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and Bangladesh have similar levels of overall contraceptive use but considerably
different method mixes. In general, there is a greater variety of contraception in
use in Bangladesh, whereas in Egypt the majority of women rely on the IUD. The
use of male methods and condoms is also slightly higher in Bangladesh, where
the most popular method appears to be the pill. The greater use of pills and condoms
may be attributed to the reliance on family planning workers, for whom these are the
easiest methods to promote in contrast to methods that are more appropriately pro-
vided in clinic settings.
The family planning program in Bangladesh is characterized by a service
delivery structure that is demedicalized and relies instead on a team of female
paramedics. The program expanded steadily through the 1970s and 1980s, and
by 1990 there were 2,354 rural family welfare centers and 24,000 female para-
medics (Cleland et al. 1994). Simmons, Mita, and Koenig (1992) make a strong
case that family planning workers are important role models for young women,
as they were the first generation of women in rural Bangladesh with formal em-
ployment. It is also significant that most of the workers are recruited from the
area in which they serve. In contrast, Egypt relies much more on doctors who are
dispatched to rural clinics, where women are expected to travel to obtain ser-
vices. Although there are 3,700 government family planning service outlets, the ma-
jority of women (63 percent) report using private-sector services. As a result, services
are physically as well as psychologically less accessible in Egypt than in Bangladesh.
Rural Development and the Role of NGOs
The approaches to rural development in Bangladesh and Egypt differ mark-
edly in terms of the role played by nongovernmental organizations. Beginning in
the 1970s, NGOs have played an increasingly important role in rural develop-
ment in Bangladesh, whereas in Egypt their activities are small scale, highly
localized, and barely visible. The historical context in which these organizations
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came into being may be relevant. In Bangladesh, the first development NGOs
were established after the war of independence in 1971. These organizations be-
gan initially with relief work to rehabilitate dislocated families. After the first
phase of rehabilitation, NGOs found themselves increasingly involved in longer-
term poverty alleviation activities for which substantial amounts of donor assis-
tance continued to be available. The focus remained on the most vulnerable com-
ponents of the population: women and children. During the 25 years since
independence, NGOs evolved to provide services in the credit, education, and
health sectors. An important common element of the style of development prac-
ticed by NGOs is their reliance on outreach services, some of which were set in
place during times of famine and other natural disasters. For instance, even now
a high level of development activities remains in the districts hardest hit during
the famine of 1974.
The four largest organizations in Bangladesh are best known for providing
credit to rural women: BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee),
Grameen Bank, ASA (Association for Social Advancement), and Proshika. To-
gether, they have outstanding loans to 3.1 million beneficiaries, most of whom
are women (Centre for Policy Dialogue 1995). According to the 1996 Demo-
graphic and Health Survey, while 7 percent of women are members of Grameen,
70 percent of all respondents lived in a village where at least one other respon-
dent was a member. The parallel figures for BRAC are 8 percent and 25 percent.
Half of all women are not eligible because they are judged to be non-poor based
on size of landholding and other criteria. Beneficiaries of these programs are
usually poor rural women who receive collateral-free credit.
While numerous NGOs are active in Egypt, the scale of operations for
most is much smaller than in Bangladesh. Similarly, there are small-scale efforts
to provide credit to women. Many of the NGOs have replicated programs such as
Grameen and BRAC, but none exists on the same scale as in Bangladesh.
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Although part of the explanation for the growth of NGOs in Bangladesh
may be attributed to the post-independence needs of reconstruction and rehabili-
tation, the relatively liberal regulatory environment also encouraged the rapid
expansion of the nongovernmental sector. NGOs in Bangladesh have consider-
able autonomy and are only loosely regulated in their receipt of foreign dona-
tions. In contrast, the regulatory environment in Egypt is much more restrictive.
It has been suggested that specific provisions in the relevant organizational laws,
such as a requirement that a senior member of the government should serve on
the board of every organization (Law 32 adopted in 1964), have inhibited the
growth of the nongovernmental sector in Egypt (Kandil 1995).
The mode of operation of NGOs undoubtedly represents an important con-
tribution to the process of social change. Unlike governmental services or the
private sector, the approach of NGOs is to involve communities and to offer
services at the community level. This is achieved through a widespread network
of rural centers and an emphasis on outreach services. For example, BRAC runs
schools in rooms donated by the local community, usually in someone’s home.
Grameen, BRAC, and ASA hold meetings in sheds or rooms constructed in the
homes of one of their members. Meetings are convened by a bank officer who
travels to the rooms where women meet. This approach of service delivery, it
may be argued, makes for a radically different environment for social interaction
than one in which services are available in urban centers or marketplaces that are
not equally accessible to all, particularly not to women.
A recent panel study of the rise in contraceptive acceptance after the intro-
duction of a credit program suggests that while program members already differ
from nonmembers to start out, the introduction of micro-credit in a village leads
to considerable increase in contraceptive use within a short time, suggesting that
micro-credit may contribute to a village environment that is more open to inno-
vative behavior (Steele, Amin, and Naved 1998). Thus, although the onset of
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fertility decline preceded NGO expansion in Bangladesh, the expansion of NGO
activities may nevertheless explain the rapid pace of contraceptive acceptance.
Contrary to the assertions made in recent articles about the family plan-
ning program in Bangladesh (Schuler et al. 1996; Schuler, Hashemi, and Jenkins
1995), there is probably not much difference in the approaches taken by credit
extension services and by the government family planning program. Both have
innovated strategies to overcome women’s lack of access to services and their
low mobility. NGOs employ large cadres of extension workers who spend the
better part of the day traveling to women’s compounds to conduct credit transac-
tions or offer education, in much the same way as the family planning providers
who call on women of reproductive age to offer them contraceptive methods.
Women who are served by these programs remain reluctant to travel large dis-
tances but are willing to use the services if they are brought to them. While door-
step delivery may enable women to remain in purdah, it may also be seen as
empowering women. Thus, by entering the homestead compound and giving
women greater access, providers of these services are expanding women’s tradi-
tional power and authority within the domestic sphere.
Indeed, in a recent statistical analysis of the effect of women’s cumulative
exposure to the visits of family welfare assistants in Bangladesh, Phillips and
Hossain (1998) found that various measures of women’s status have improved.
This can be partially explained by the effect of outreach on fertility and the im-
proved status that is associated with birth planning.
Egypt’s rural development approach is far more traditional and focuses
primarily on men. The government bureaucracy plays a considerable role, and
nongovernmental organizations a very limited one. Investments in modernizing
agricultural technology have been the key. These have been accompanied by
investments in transportation networks and rural electrification. The pivotal role
of state bureaucracies is reflected in the attention given to them in studies of the
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rural political economy in Egypt (see Hopkins 1987; Adams 1986; Richards 1982).
These studies are also remarkable for their lack of attention to gender issues.
In terms of such issues, Egypt has invested in affirmative action programs
in the public sector to give preferential treatment to women. As a result, most
women who work in Egypt are engaged in public-sector employment. These poli-
cies have created opportunities for women to leave home for work, thus influenc-
ing fertility through the more traditional routes of increasing the opportunity costs
of women’s time. By contrast, the recent upswing in the proportion of women in
Bangladesh working for cash at home is most likely attributable to the credit
programs run by various large NGOs.
Education for Girls
Both Egypt and Bangladesh have seen gradually rising school enrollment
over the past three decades, with a more rapid increase among the youngest co-
horts. These changes in educational attainment for girls have been associated
with specific policy decisions. The low levels of education among adult women
surveyed support the view that rising enrollment is a relatively new phenom-
enon.
Proportions of ever-married women who have never been to school in ru-
ral areas remain high in both countries despite some decline. Table 4 shows that
80 percent of ever-married women in rural Bangladesh and 71 percent of ever-
married women in rural Egypt reported no education in the World Fertility Sur-
veys conducted in 1975 and 1980 respectively. In Bangladesh the percentage of
women with no education in rural areas fell to 71 percent by 1988–89 and to 59
percent by 1996–97. The data suggest that the extent of illiteracy of reproduc-
tive-aged women, as measured by proportions who never went to school, is cur-
rently about the same in the rural areas of the two countries (about 60 percent),
and is some 10 percentage points higher in Bangladesh than in Egypt for urban
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areas. Taking another measure of schooling—the proportion of women with at
least four years of education—we also see surprising similarity between rural
Bangladesh and Egypt, with only about a third of women having gone that far in
school (see Table 2).
Examining trends in educational attainment, we see some recent improve-
ments in the situation of girls that we expect will have positive implications for
gender systems in both countries. Figure 2 compares proportions by age group
who have completed grade four in both settings. Overall levels of attainment are
much higher for boys in Egypt than in Bangladesh, reflecting Egypt’s higher
level of socioeconomic development. Girls in urban areas also have shown higher
levels of attainment in Egypt than Bangladesh. Up until the more recent periods
shown, however, girls in rural Egypt and rural Bangladesh have fared equally
poorly. The rise in enrollment in recent cohorts is more pronounced for girls in
Egypt than in Bangladesh. However, because enrollment for boys has remained
static in Bangladesh while it has increased for both sexes in Egypt, the gender
gap has narrowed more rapidly in Bangladesh, despite evidence of some narrow-
ing of the gender gap for both countries. This suggests that recent development
strategies in Bangladesh that have focused on the poor and disadvantaged, in
particular on girls, have paid off and will have long-term implications for women’s
status. Nevertheless, overall levels of school attainment in Bangladesh are still very
low, reflecting higher levels of poverty and greater parental needs for child labor.
In Bangladesh, three large-scale government interventions can be identi-
fied as directly affecting girls’ enrollment and reducing gender differentials. First,
in addition to free primary education for all, secondary school education was
made free for girls in the mid-1980s while boys continued to pay fees, resulting
in the first reduction of the gender gap. Second, in 1994 two further interventions
provided added subsidies and incentives to education, but only in rural areas.
These were a food-for-education program for poor primary school children and a
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secondary school scholarship scheme for girls (Amin and Sedgh 1998). Further-
more, beginning in the 1980s, NGO initiatives to encourage nonformal educa-
tion probably helped to boost young-age enrollment. The scale of these programs
is large enough to affect national enrollment rates in a manner not usually ex-
pected of private initiatives. The largest program is run by BRAC, which in 1996
was operating some 35,000 schools with 30 students each, providing up to three
years of education. With only 56,000 public primary schools in place, it is clear
that BRAC schools play a considerable role in providing education to the young-
est age groups.
Well before the adoption of the Egyptian Constitution in 1971, the govern-
ment was committed to providing free basic education to all Egyptian children in
state-run institutions. In 1981, compulsory schooling in Egypt was extended from
six to nine years but never fully enforced (Shafey 1998). In the face of economic
difficulties in the mid-1980s and to fulfill the cost recovery requirements of struc-
tural adjustment, the Ministry of Education was forced to institute modest school
fees (Fergany, Farmaz, and Wissa 1997), and in 1988 the duration of basic school-
ing was reduced from nine to eight years. A marked increase in political commit-
ment to education has occurred in the 1990s. President Mubarak declared educa-
tion the national project for the decade, and major education reforms were instituted
in 1991 focusing primarily on infrastructure (Shafey 1998). The introduction of
alternative schools in underserved areas, such as one-room schools and commu-
nity schools in collaboration with UNICEF, represents new approaches particu-
larly focused on the underenrollment of girls. While enrollments have been ris-
ing in response to these initiatives, there is also evidence of declines in quality of
schooling since the late 1980s resulting from overcrowding and doubleshifting
(Shafey 1998).
Improvements in educational access as well as greater gender equality in
educational opportunities can have implications for aspects of the gender system
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we have discussed thus far—namely, marriage, work, and seclusion—as well as
for fertility more directly. Greater participation in school and more years of edu-
cation for girls tend to delay marriage and may even have implications for mar-
riage costs if educated brides are more highly valued. More schooling for girls is
also associated with greater workforce participation upon completion of school-
ing, whether before marriage or after. It is also associated with differences in the
practice of purdah, with considerable long-term implications for women’s status
and the gender system itself. Rising levels of education in the community can
also have more immediate effects even on illiterate women, who can experience
the wider world through the lives of their school-going daughters. Finally, educa-
tion raises the costs associated with rearing children and thus motivates parents to
have lower fertility.
Government Response to Rising Religious Fundamentalism
The overwhelming majority of the population in both Egypt and Bangladesh
is Muslim (see Table 1). For many years, the stated opposition of Islamic clerics
to reproductive freedoms for women was widely felt to be an impediment to
fertility decline. This view was given empirical credence by somewhat dated
evidence of delayed onset of fertility decline in Muslim-majority settings, all of
which have since experienced rapid change in fertility and mortality. It is impor-
tant to note that, while there is evidence of rising religious extremism in both
Egypt and Bangladesh, these movements occurred during the course of rapid
fertility declines in both countries.
A recent analysis by Obermeyer (1995) points to the importance of the
politics of religious movements rather than to religious doctrine per se as a po-
tential factor in the pace of fertility decline. The contrast between Egypt and
Bangladesh lends support to this view and highlights the role of the state in modi-
fying or conditioning the impact of religious extremism. The rising influence of
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Pan-Islamic movements in the 1970s, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, was evident
in both countries. These movements appeared to exert considerable influence
within organized political parties and also exerted some influence on social de-
velopment activities. The political activities of the most extremist parties in Egypt
have been either banned or severely circumscribed (Terterov 1996); in Bangladesh
the activities of specific Islamic political parties were curtailed in the initial years
of independence, but these parties are now allowed to participate in national elec-
tions. In Bangladesh, despite their highly sophisticated organizational structure
and probably because of the relatively tolerant attitude of the government, the
extremists have little popular support. The lack of support for religious political
parties in Bangladesh was demonstrated in the most recent parliamentary elec-
tions: the religious parties contested all 300 seats but secured only three seats in
the Parliament.
Some analysts have attributed the declining influence of Islamic groups in
Bangladesh to the increasing participation of women in elections. In the 1996
elections, voter turnout was higher for women than for men (Rahman 1996).
Women’s participation is promoted by mass voter education campaigns, orga-
nized by the government, NGOs, and civil society, that emphasize the impor-
tance of participation and the right of each individual to vote according to her
own preference. Polling officers also accommodate women’s need for maintain-
ing purdah by setting up separate voting booths for men and women.
Since elections are few and far between in Egypt, there is no direct basis
for comparison. Several commentators have suggested that the banned Islamic
groups have acquired a significant popular following. The repressive stance of
various Egyptian governments, which at times have resorted to large-scale im-
prisonment of the followers of certain political groups, coupled with the consid-
erable role these groups have played in providing health and education services
to the poor, may have contributed to the popular support for extremists. Ismail
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(1998) attributes the increasing popularity of the Islamist movement to the di-
minishing welfare role of the state in Egypt.
It is likely that the significance of religious trends for fertility lies in the
extent to which they influence the nature of social interaction. In Bangladesh, the
relatively tolerant state response to rising extremism has probably made it irrel-
evant for demographic trends. However, the Bangladesh government has not faced
the same challenges as the Egyptian government. President Sadat’s assassination
accentuated the tensions within Egyptian society and hardened the government
stance against religious extremists. Repressive state responses in Egypt may have
contributed to creating a more hostile environment for positive social change in
general as well as for fertility change in particular, especially among the poor and
disadvantaged groups. The Egyptian government now faces difficult choices. For
example, while the recent government ban of veiling in Egyptian schools might
be seen as a feminist act by some, in the current political environment it can be
alternatively interpreted as insensitive, anti-religious, and undemocratic.
Implications of State Policy for Fertility Change
What, then, explains the relatively rapid fertility decline in Bangladesh?
Bangladesh has followed a somewhat distinct pattern of development, with con-
siderable emphasis on reaching the rural poor and women and a strong reliance
on nongovernmental institutions, that may have played a part in bringing about
more rapid social change (including fertility change) despite low levels of devel-
opment. We conjecture that the objectives of targeting underserved segments of
the population, and the means of attaining that objective through a heavy reliance
on outreach, may have played an important role in fertility decline. The deploy-
ment of large cadres of fieldworkers in health, family planning, and rural credit
services has direct implications for the opportunities available to women.10 The
changes brought about by these services are evident in the proportions of women
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who are using contraception and who are within easy access of contraceptives,
health services, and credit. An important indirect byproduct of these new and
large networks of workers may have been the changes brought about in the social
networks through which women encounter and evaluate new ideas and informa-
tion that affect their notions about ideal family size and motivation to control
fertility (Casterline 1998). Other small changes in social and political life may
also play a part in creating a society that takes to innovation easily. Some recent
changes in election practices have resulted in high voter turnouts especially among
women; and the increasing value placed on social consensus and democratic pro-
cesses may be responsible for more tolerant attitudes toward extremist tenden-
cies, whether in religious fundamentalism or in women’s movements, that help
to defuse the extreme elements in these movements.
An entirely different causal mechanism appears to lie behind trends in fer-
tility in Egypt. Given the remarkable rise in overall income, consumption, and
education during a time of declining fertility, a case can easily be made to fit
Egypt into a more traditional demographic transition model that relates fertility
to steadily improving standards of living.11 Another factor driving the Egyptian
trends is the high level of urbanization and the attendant influences of urban life
on both urban and rural fertility aspirations.
A critical distinction between the experiences of Bangladesh and Egypt is
the extent of women’s participation in the process of change and the implications
of these experiences for women’s lives in the future, in the context of smaller
families.
CONCLUSION
Since the early 1980s, Bangladesh and Egypt have experienced similarly
rapid fertility declines. The similarity in trends is most clearly demonstrated when
data are disaggregated for rural and urban women. Contraceptive levels are now
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similar in both rural and urban areas, and, given the later ages at marriage and
higher levels of development in Egypt, Bangladesh appears to have achieved
unexpectedly low levels of fertility during the 1990s when the pace of the decline
accelerated. The longer duration of breastfeeding in Bangladesh only partially
compensates for the much earlier ages at marriage in that country. Therefore,
lower-than-expected levels of fertility in Bangladesh must be explained by lower
levels of desired fertility, the greater availability of abortion and contraceptive
services that have resulted in a more varied method mix, and the more effective
and efficient use of contraception in Bangladesh relative to Egypt.
During this period of rapid fertility decline in Egypt and Bangladesh, there
is little evidence of change in the standard measures of women’s status and au-
tonomy that are usually associated with lower fertility. While women’s educa-
tional levels have improved slowly, evidence of rapid change in enrollment rates
of children and a reduction in the gender gap in education in both countries have
appeared only recently. Egypt has higher levels of overall educational attainment
but also a larger gender gap in schooling than Bangladesh. In general, changes in
education in both countries appear to have occurred well after the fertility decline
was underway.
Some of the resistance to greater autonomy for women may be attributed
to rising religious extremism in both settings during the 1980s. However, the
politics of religious extremism were experienced differently in the two countries
and it is likely that the influence of extremism was not as harsh in Bangladesh as
in Egypt. The two settings also differed significantly in their styles of develop-
ment. Egypt followed a more traditional approach of infrastructural development,
whereas Bangladesh followed an approach focused on poverty alleviation that
targeted resources and services to the poor and to women. The difference in ap-
proach was probably most pronounced in the areas of family planning services
and availability of rural credit services. In Bangladesh, development programs
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concentrated on addressing barriers to women’s access to services. The design of
service delivery in all sectors in Egypt has been based on the assumption that
clients will seek out the services.
Social trends, the political climate, and the strategy of development may
have resulted in an environment in Bangladesh that is more open to innovation
and change. Furthermore, the approach to development typified by the Bangladesh
experience may provide more opportunities for women, particularly poor women.
Rather than directly promoting the labor force participation of women, greater
emphasis has been placed on reducing barriers to women’s access to resources.
This approach to development does not challenge the corporate nature of the
family and household by promoting autonomous behavior, but rather enables
women, through access to family planning and health resources as well as credit,
to expand and strengthen their traditional spheres of influence within the family.
While accommodating women’s traditional roles within the family that center on
care and nurturing, this strategy expands women’s influence by giving them di-
rect access to services, information, and cash.
This comparison between Bangladesh and Egypt leads us to two final ob-
servations. First, low levels of women’s autonomy have been no barrier to fertil-
ity decline in either country. Second, the process of fertility decline can bring
with it the seeds of change for gender relations, as women gain greater control
over their fertility in a way that meets their reproductive health needs and the
needs of their families. Some evidence of this exists in the recent upsurge of
women working for cash in Bangladesh. Despite greater poverty for women in
Bangladesh, it appears that a service and NGO environment that expands women’s
access to and control of resources within the home and puts them in touch with
women from outside their immediate social network—a domain of traditional
status and influence for women—has resulted in stronger motivation to limit
fertility. In Egypt, where the causal mechanism for change operates in the public
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domain, with greater potential for causing conflict within the private domain of
the family, the motivations to limit family size appear to be weaker. While we
expect that fertility decline will eventually expand opportunities for women in
both Bangladesh and Egypt, the evidence indicates that women in Bangladesh,
despite their greater poverty, have become more immediate beneficiaries of that
process.
One lesson that emerges from these two case studies is that even though
changes in gender relations are not the trigger for fertility transition, population
and development policies can have strong intended and unintended gender di-
mensions. Nevertheless, where women’s needs must be served but their lives
remain severely constrained, policymakers face difficult choices. Is it better for
policymakers to accept those constraints and try to broaden women’s opportuni-
ties by bringing services to them, or is it better to create opportunities for women
outside their traditional sphere that require them to challenge the power struc-
tures in order to take up those opportunities?
While this question has been debated in countries like Bangladesh for some
time,12 our analysis can provide some insight. Without ignoring the extreme pov-
erty and constraints that continue to face women in that society, we have shown
that considerable change in the control of reproduction, in the education of girls,
and, more recently, in women’s access to income have come about with incre-
mental changes in women’s opportunities rather than revolutionary changes in
underlying gender relations. It remains uncertain, however, whether the expan-
sion of opportunities that Bangladeshi women have experienced within the home
will ultimately be “empowering” for women in the ways intended by the lan-
guage of the Cairo Programme of Action. What is clear, nonetheless, is the enor-
mous difficulties girls and women face in taking up new roles when they lack
social support or public assistance. Given the enormous distance societies need
to travel to achieve the ambitious goals of the Cairo agenda, policies need to
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focus not just on the creation of opportunities for women but, as importantly, on the
provision of social supports that allow women to take advantage of those opportuni-
ties. It is particularly in this area that the NGO sector can play a crucial role.
Notes
The authors gratefully acknowledge comments from John Bongaarts, Judith Bruce,
John Casterline, Adrienne Germain, Donald Heisel, Barbara Ibrahim, Carolyn
Makinson, and Gita Sen in the preparation of this paper.
1 Regression estimates associating contraceptive use with total fertility sug-
gest that a 10 percentage point difference in contraceptive use is required
to predict a fertility difference of 0.7 births (Mauldin and Segal 1988).
2 Another proximate determinant that can contribute to fertility is the dura-
tion of amenorrhea associated with breastfeeding. Table 1 shows that mean
duration of amenorrhea after birth is somewhat greater in Bangladesh be-
cause of longer durations of breastfeeding.
3 See Casterline (1998), Mason (1997a), and Bongaarts and Watkins (1996)
for recent references; for earlier descriptions see Coale (1973), Kreager
(1991), and Lesthaeghe (1980).
4 These factors are the percentage of people expected to die before the age of 40,
the percent of adults who are illiterate, and a composite measure of standard of
living, including the percentage of people with access to health services and
safe water and the percentage of malnourished children under age five.
5 While levels of poverty are considerable in both countries, in Bangladesh there
is some consensus that improvements are evident (Sobhan 1995). Discussions
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among policymakers in Egypt reflect continued concern about regional dis-
parities, notwithstanding a recent IFPRI study challenging past measures of
regional differences (El-Laithy 1998; Datt, Jolliffe, and Sharma 1997).
6 The figure for Egypt is based on the calculation that only 6 percent of the
land mass is inhabited, whereas the figure for Bangladesh is based on the
assumption that 100 percent is occupied (Egypt DHS 1995; Bangladesh
DHS 1996).
7 For example, in Bangladesh estimates of female labor force participation
rates rose from 8 percent in 1984–85 to 62 percent in 1989 as a result of the
broadening of the definition of work from one labor force survey to the
next to include previously excluded categories such as threshing/cleaning,
husking/drying/boiling, processing and preservation of food, poultry care
and raising, and livestock care and raising (Rahman 1996). Trends implied
by such changes in definition are clearly implausible.
8 Nowhere in any of these surveys is the reference period clearly specified.
Does the question posed imply work in the last week, month, or season? It
seems to have been left up to the respondent to interpret. Fortunately, the
narrower the definition of work, the less sensitive the measure is to varia-
tions in the reference period or minimum work-time requirement (Anker
1990). Indeed, it appears that, in countries like Bangladesh and Egypt,
where few women work for cash after marriage, the proportion of women
who have ever worked after marriage and the proportion of women who
are currently working are remarkably similar (United Nations 1985). This
suggests that the small minority of women who work are consistent in
their pattern of work and very different from the majority of other women
who never work.
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9 Our estimates for rural Egypt are slightly lower than estimates made in a
special methodological survey conducted by CAPMAS in rural Egypt in
1983 to refine the measurement of labor force concepts; in that survey the
paid labor force participation rate for women varied between 11 and 15
percent depending on the reference period but included “in kind” work,
which was not included in our definition (Anker 1990). On the other hand,
our estimates for Bangladesh appear slightly higher than the overall rate of
8 percent estimated by Rahman (1993) for 1984–85. Given the problems
associated with estimating women’s work in low-income countries, even
when we restrict ourselves to cash work, it is difficult to assign much mean-
ing to small statistical differences.
10 While the large cadres of government family planning and health workers
have been in place since the late 1970s, NGO activities in credit and other
social services took a discrete jump from relatively low levels in the early
1990s with the rapid expansion of the Grameen, BRAC, and ASA pro-
grams (Sobhan 1995).
11 Some farfetched claims have been made to explain fluctuations in crude
birth rates that are probably in part explained by shifts in the age structure
produced by declining mortality. In particular, Fargues (1997) attributes
rising birth rates in the 1970s to the open economy policy, or infitah, re-
sulting in rising wages, remittances from abroad, and a construction boom;
this period was followed by an economic downturn in the 1980s coincid-
ing with a fall in birth rates. The same analysis contains contradictory, but
more convincing data relating monotonically rising educational attainment
to monotonically declining fertility during the same time period in which
crude birth rates appear to fluctuate.
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12 Recently, the Bangladesh family planning program has decided to shift
from home delivery to onsite clinic services. An important question is
whether women, given their limited mobility, will feel free to travel to
clinics for services.
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